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Newsletter

July 2026

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Hedging in a Volatile Market:
Why the Floor has a Ceiling

If you have glanced at a commodity screen over the past twelve months, you have watched a market that refuses to sit still. Several of the commodities our industry lives and dies by have given back close to half their value since peaking earlier this year. Gold is off nearly 29% from its high. Silver has been cut roughly in half. WTI crude has shed about 41%. Natural gas, after a January cold snap sent it screaming higher, has fallen almost 58%. Swings like that do not just rattle traders. They tear through an economic model that was not built to absorb them.

​​​​​​​Hedging is not part of a typical engineer's day. The mechanics live a few doors down, in treasury or commercial. But the output lands squarely on your desk, because the price your company actually realizes for a barrel, an ounce, or a MMBtu is one of the most important assumptions in any evaluation you run. Understanding how your company hedges buys you one of two things: the peace of mind that your downside is protected, or the mild headache of knowing exactly how much money you left on the table when prices ran the other way.

 

 
 
 
 
 
The two pieces every hedge is built from

 

Hedges come in all shapes and sizes, but most are built from two simple pieces. A put is downside insurance. You pay a premium, and in exchange you set a floor under the price you will receive. A call is the opposite. When you sell one, you collect a premium, but you agree to a ceiling on what you can realize. Combine them and you get the workhorse of the industry, the costless collar: buy a put for a floor, sell a call for a ceiling, and let the premium you collect on the call pay for the put. On paper, it costs nothing to put in place. That word, costless, is where a lot of people get tripped up.

A collar is not free. It is paid for in opportunity cost. The premiums wash out up front, but you have sold away everything above your ceiling. If prices stay inside your band, the strategy works beautifully and you sleep well. If prices break above the ceiling, every dollar of that run belongs to the party on the other side of your call, not to you. Two practical notes worth remembering: companies rarely hedge all of their production, and hedges rarely run more than a couple of years out. Buying protection on prices three to five years away, when nobody has any real idea where they will land, gets expensive fast.

Pioneer learned the ceiling lesson the hard way

Pioneer Natural Resources found the limit of that ceiling in real time. Coming out of 2020, with oil depressed around $40, the company layered on a sizable hedge position to protect a fragile balance sheet. It was a reasonable move at the time. Then oil ripped past $70 in 2021. The floors Pioneer had bought went unused, because you do not need downside insurance in a rally, but the upside it had sold came due. Every dollar oil traded above its ceilings was a dollar owed on those contracts. The hedging losses Pioneer reported climbed north of two billion dollars for the year. Management got the message. The following year's program was far lighter, and the CEO said plainly that the company would minimize hedging and take its chances with full exposure to the price.

Barrick spent twenty years writing the definitive cautionary tale

On the mining side, Barrick Gold wrote the textbook version, and it took two decades to finish. Starting in the 1980s, Barrick built a large book of forward gold sales. In the early, weaker years for gold, those locked-in prices were a genuine advantage and helped fund the company's growth. Then gold bottomed around the turn of the century and went on a rally that ran most of the decade. Because Barrick had sold its gold forward, it could not participate in the climb. The hedge book turned into a multi-billion dollar liability and a constant drag on the stock, as investors who wanted exposure to rising gold simply looked elsewhere. By 2009, with the book roughly 5.6 billion dollars underwater, new management raised billions in equity, bought back the contracts, and swallowed the charge. Barrick has been effectively unhedged ever since, and the whole saga now lives on as a Harvard Business School case study on the downside of hedging.

What this means if you own the stock

None of this is hidden. Most public producers tout their hedge positions right in their quarterly investor decks, laying out how much of next year's production is covered and at what prices. It is an easy way to calm nervous investors who know how violent these markets can be. It is also information you should read closely if you ever buy or sell a producer's stock, because a hedge book can quietly undo your entire investment thesis.

Take current oil price fluctuations as an example. Suppose you bought an oil and gas name on the buildup of military hardware heading to Iran, betting that if things in the region escalated, oil would spike and your stock would ride it up. The escalation comes, oil does spike, and then you discover the company is hedged to the eyeballs and cannot capture a dime of the run. Your thesis was right and your stock barely moved. As I say in my classes, I am not a certified financial planner, and this is not investment advice.

Same tradeoff, smaller account

There is a personal angle here too. While I was pulling notes together for this piece, I listened to an episode of The Diary of a CEO featuring Jeremy Grantham, who is calling for an AI-driven bubble and a bear market in the United States. If he is right, is now the moment to put a little hedge under our own portfolios? Or would we just be lining up to be the next Pioneer or Barrick, paying for protection and then watching the market go up without us? It is the same tradeoff every producer wrestles with, only with your own money on the line.

Polish up your crystal ball.​​

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